'Chaos' is fueling fights among Putin's top commanders. These are the players battling for power.

• The Wagner Group's failed mutiny exposed major cracks in Vladimir Putin's domestic authority. 
• The worsening chaos has fueled further hostility and power plays in the Russian ranks.
• "We are definitely seeing more figures push for their own interests," a Russia expert told Insider.

The Wagner Group's armed rebellion against Russia's military leadership may have been short-lived, but the fallout from the insurrection is far from over.

More than three weeks after the historic challenge to Russian President Vladimir Putin's authority, there's still internal power plays and high-level purges in motion. Some top figures are tightening their grips on power as other prominent figures fall, having been exiled, detained, or dismissed.

War experts say what we're seeing unfold is that several high-ranking officials and influential figures are fixated on their own personal goals, hold different opinions of Moscow's military leadership, and maintain different views on how the war in Ukraine should be fought. Wagner's insurrection appears to have only poured fuel on the fire as longstanding infighting threatens the cohesion of Moscow's military.

And a danger for the Kremlin here is that the mutiny showed that Putin "doesn't have the monopoly of violence to the same extent that he used to," Kateryna Stepanenko, a Russia analyst at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), told Insider. "We are seeing a lot of military formations and military figures that are pushing for their own objectives." But the top military leaders are also pushing back.

For months leading up to Wagner's rebellion, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the founder of the Wagner Group private military company who became increasingly critical of the conduct of the war, frequently clashed with Moscow's defense ministry in a publicized feud that covered everything from battlefield strategy to lack of ammunition, and even Putin's justifications for waging war on his neighbor.

The tensions boiled over on June 23 when Prigozhin turned his mercenary organization famous for its culture of extreme violence away from eastern Ukraine and launched an invasion of Russia that saw Wagner forces marching toward Moscow. They were only a few hours out when Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko helped broker a deal between Prigozhin and the Kremlin that sent him and some number of his fighters into exile. 

Prigozhin's whereabouts since the rebellion have been a mystery, with different explanations swirling around. There's evidence the former warlord is at a military camp in Belarus, but the once-outspoken critic of the defense ministry has gone silent.

Western officials have asserted that Prigozhin's actions in June exposed serious cracks within Russian military leadership, which is already under fire for its handling of the war in Ukraine. But he's not the only influential figure who believes things could be run differently — perhaps for personal benefit — in Moscow, and new rifts are emerging, even as the defense ministry clamps down.

"There's so much chaos within the Russian Ministry of Defense, within the Russian Armed Forces, that allows for these figures to push for their own objectives and for their own visions of the war," Stepanenko said. "I don't think it's as extreme as Prigozhin, however, we are definitely seeing more figures push for their own interests, despite the fact that they have the common goal of occupying the entirety of Ukraine."

Putin's top general, the man at the heart of the fighting

A key aspect of the power dynamics in Moscow is whether these figures support Russian Gen. Valery Gerasimov, who has overseen the war in Ukraine for nearly all of 2023. In the pro-Gerasimov camp, there are key players who benefit from being in his inner circle and that of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, who, like Gerasimov, appears to have Putin's favor at the moment.

One such figure is Ramzan Kadyrov, a warlord who leads a band of Chechen fighters. Although he has butted heads with Russia's defense ministry in the past and has even praised the Wagner Group for its efforts in Ukraine, Kadyrov ultimately sided with Moscow's military leadership during the mutiny and even offered to send his fighters to stop Wagner. 

Kadyrov has historically been vocal about wanting his forces to avoid fighting in Ukraine, Stepanenko said, and he even managed to persuade Putin to deploy some of his fighters to Russia's Belgorod region, which borders northeastern Ukraine, instead of into the fray on the other side of that border.

But there's also an anti-Gerasimov camp made up of officers and commanders who think he is incompetent, unable to administer military changes, and tends to prioritize having his own people in command. Their ultimate goal is not to purge the Kremlin but rather to push a change in the military command and prove to Putin that Gerasimov is a poor leader, and this group has become much more outspoken, even as their vocal criticisms of Russia's military leadership comes at a cost.

Some people in the anti-Gerasimov camp are associated with the Wagner Group, the most obvious being Prigozhin, who has long been critical of Gerasimov and Shoigu and who positioned his mutiny to pressure Putin into removing them, Stepanenko said. 

"Not everyone is happy with the command that is in power. There's commanders that perceive Gerasimov and Shoigu as weak leaders," she added. "Their main objective is to convince Putin that there needs to be some change within the military command structure."

Another notable figure in the anti-Gerasimov camp is Col. Gen. Mikhail Teplinsky, who is the commander of Russia's VDV Airborne Forces and has maintained affiliations with Wagner. A favorite to Russian ultranationalists, Teplinsky oversaw successful operations in Ukraine last fall only to be dismissed from his position by Gerasimov after he took over from Gen. Sergei Surovikin, another figure popular among the pro-war community, earlier this year, which prompted a certain degree of insubordination from the Russian airborne commander.

Britain's defense ministry said at the time that the sudden shake-up was likely the result of fractures within Russia's military leadership and the consequence of Gerasimov trying to "impose his personal authority" on Russia's war machine.

But Teplinsky was ultimately brought back into a leadership role, despite expressing his frustration with the military command directly to Putin, ISW, a Washington-based think tank, noted in an April assessment. 

"Teplinsky is a good example of a commander promoting his own interests," Stepanenko said. "There's obviously likely more of these commanders that are pushing their own objectives, trying to promote their personalities, and have information networks that they use to emphasize and uplift their reputation."

Shifts in military command are mainly efforts to obtain access to resources or dictate how particular military units are used, Stepanenko said. For example, in Kadyrov's case, he may be pushing for control to shield his fighters from the battlefield in Ukraine and send conventional Russian forces instead.   

"Almost everyone is trying to protect their own personnel and their own resources" in addition to getting closer to Putin, she said. Among other things, Prigozhin's motivation for the mutiny, she noted, seemed to be securing more equipment and social benefits for his forces.  

Consequences for disobedience

Insubordination against Moscow's military leadership, such as Teplinsky's criticisms or the Wagner's rebellion, has undermined Russian military leaders but has also come with consequences for members of the anti-Gerasimov camp. Prigozhin was first on the chopping block — seemingly cast into exile in Belarus with his mercenary organization, which was stripped of all its heavy weaponry — but it didn't stop there.

Gen. Sergei Surovikin, who previously commanded Russian operations in Ukraine and had ties to Wagner, was reportedly detained in the wake of the mutiny and hasn't been seen since. There certainly appears to be more at work than just rumors he's resting, as one political figure claimed.

Two Russian commanders are also said to have been removed from their posts.

Maj. Gen. Ivan Popov, who previously commanded Russia's 58th Combined Arms Army, was apparently dismissed from his role recently after calling attention to shortcomings in Moscow's artillery defense, among other weaknesses on the front lines. And Maj. Gen. Vladimir Seliverstov, who led the 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division is said to have been dismissed from his role. According to a July 16 ISW assessment that cited Russian sources, even Teplinsky may be back in hot water now.

After he was relieved of his command, Popov said in an audio recording shared online that "our senior commander hit us from the rear, treacherously and vilely decapitating the army at the most difficult and tense moment," a reference to an ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive push.

"The Russian MoD has begun to remove commanders from some of the Russian military's most combat effective units and formations and appears to be accelerating this effort," ISW experts wrote, adding that "the apparent Russian chain of command crisis threatens to demoralize the wider Russian war effort in Ukraine." And these challenges may also extend down to unit levels, exacerbating problems.

There have also been changes to Russia's internal security dynamics in the aftermath of Wagner's rebellion, like the militarization of the Gen. Viktor Zolotov-led National Guard. This force's border guards let armed Wagner columns through rather than attempt to resist during the revolt.

In the wake of the mutiny, during which Wagner forces shot down several Russian aircraft and killed a handful of pilots, the National Guard asked Putin for armored vehicles and other heavy military equipment under the premise of boosting security along Russia's western borders.

"There's some interesting power play ongoing there," Stepanenko said of the National Guard's ability to secure additional military capabilities, though it's too soon to determine what it means for the major players. 

Another shift is underway in Russia's Belgorod region, where Putin previously had no interest in allocating resources to defend these areas, Stepanenko said. But ISW noted in a July 6 assessment that the region's governor, Vyacheslav Gladkov, had stated that Belgorod would be boosting its territorial defense units.  

"Some security organs in Russia are getting a little bit more responsibilities and military capabilities that they did not have before," Stepanenko said. This will ultimately be beneficial for Ukraine because these resources will not be seen on the battlefield and will instead be committed to protecting the Russian homeland.

The instability increasingly endemic to the Russian military comes as the Ukrainians try to break through their defensive lines. It's not a good time at the Kremlin, and as Prigozhin's revolt showed, the infighting can always get a lot worse.